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ABSTRACT 
The LUC4,6 cryptosystem is a system analogy to RSA cryptosystem and extended 
from LUC and LUC3 cryptosystems. Therefore, the security problem of the LUC4,6 
cryptosystem is based on integer factorization which is similar to RSA, LUC and 
LUC3 cryptosystems.  The Hastad's attack is one of the polynomial attack which 
relied on the polynomial structure of RSA-type cryptosystem.  In this paper, Hastad's 
Theorem will be used to solve a system of multivariate modular equations and 
Coppersmith Theorem will be used to find a root of a modular equation. Thus, the 
number of plaintexts which are required to succeed the attack can be found. 
 
Keywords: Hastad's Theorem, Coppersmith Theorem, Lucas Sequence, Dickson 
Polynomial. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The fourth and sixth order of LUC cryptosystem or LUC4,6 
cryptosystem (Wong (2007) had been proposed  in 2007. This cryptosystem 
is analogous to the RSA cryptosystem and extended from LUC and LUC3 
cryptosystems.  The LUC4,6 cryptosystem was derived from the fourth order 
linear recurrence relation which is related to Quartic polynomial and based 
on the Lucas function.   
  
The security problem for LUC4,6 cryptosystem is based on integer 
factorization which is similar to RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (1978)), 
LUC (Smith and Lennon (1993)) and LUC3 cryptosystems [Said and John].  
The Hastad’s attack is one of the polynomial attack which relied on the 
polynomial structure of RSA-type cryptosystem.  Therefore, the Hastad’s 
attack is able to solve the underlying intractable problem which the attack 
do not factor the RSA- modulus, n for the LUC4,6 cryptosystem directly.  It 
used the other solution to recover the plaintext. 
 
In 1986, Hastad showed that using RSA with low public exponent 
is insecure if the users are sending linearly related plaintexts over a large 
network (Hastad (1986)).  Therefore, Hastad develop a technique to solve a 
system of univariate modular equations to succeed his attack.  Besides that, 
Coppersmith proposed a new method for finding a root of a modular 
equation (Coppersmith (1996)), which turned out to be a better way to 
succeed a successful attack in 1996. 
 
In this paper, the Hastad’s attack will be attack on the RSA, LUC 
and LUC3 cryptosystems, and extended on the LUC4,6 cryptosystem.  The 
cryptosystem will be presented in Section 2.  The theorems which are used 
in the attack will be presented in Section 3.  In section 4, the Hastad’s attack 
will be proposed and discussed.  Finally, the conclusion had been make in 
the last section. 
 
2.  THE CRYPTOSYSTEM 
2.1 RSA Cryptosystem 
In the RSA cryptosystem, a plaintext M can use an encryption key ( , )e n  to 
encrypt it become a ciphertext  C.  The encryption process as follows. 
 
First, the user can use any standard representation to represent the plaintext 
as an integer between 0 and 1.n −  The purpose is getting the plaintext in the 
numeric form for process encryption used. 
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Then, the user encrypt the plaintext, M become ciphertext, C. The 
encryption algorithm defined as   
 
( ) modeE M C M n= ≡                                 (1) 
 
When the receiver want to decrypt the ciphertext, the user must has a 
decryption key denote by 1 mod ( ),d e nφ−≡ where n pq=  and Euler 
function, ( ) ( 1)( 1).n p qφ = − − Then, the decryption algorithms defined as  
 
( ) moddD C C n≡ .                                (2) 
 
Note that, the encryption key,  must be relative prime to 1p −  and 1.q −
By the extended Euclidean algorithm, the decryption key,  can be compute 
as follows. 
gcd( ,( 1)( 1)) 1,d p q− − =                                 (3)        
 
1mod( 1)( 1).ed p q≡ − −                                  (4) 
 
where gcd is greatest common divisor and ,  are also relatively prime.   
 
2.2 LUC Cryptosystem 
Let n  be the product of two different odd primes, p  and ,q  and the 
number e  must be relatively primes to 1,p − 1,p + 1q −  and 1.q + The 
encryption process of  LUC cryptosystem can be defined as 
 
( ) ( ,1)mod ,eE M C V M n= ≡                    (5) 
 
where ( ,1)eV M  is second order Lucas sequence, M  is the plaintext and C  
is the ciphertext.   
 
The corresponding decryption key, d  can be generated by  
 
1mod ( ),ed S n≡                                         (6) 
where ( ) ( ( ))( ( )),D DS n p q
p q
= − −
2 4D C= − , and ( )), ( )D D
p q
 are the 
Legendre symbols of  D  with respect to p  and .q  Therefore, there are four 
possible decryption keys, 
 
( )1 mod ( 1)( 1) ,d e p q−≡ + +                           (7) 
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( )1 mod ( 1)( 1) ,d e p q−≡ + −                           (8) 
 
( )1 mod ( 1)( 1) ,d e p q−≡ − +                                 (9) 
 
( )1 mod ( 1)( 1) .d e p q−≡ − −                                (10) 
 
The decryption process is similar to the encryption process, with e  replaced 
by d  and M replaced by .C   
 
 ( ,1)moddM V C n≡ .                              (11) 
 
2.3 LUC3 Cryptosystem 
As in the RSA and LUC cryptosystems, the Cubic analogue to the RSA 
cryptosystem or LUC3 cryptosystem has a number  or we called RSA-
modulus which is the product of two prime numbers p and q.  In the 
encryption process, the encryption key,  must chosen be relatively prime to 
the Euler totient function ( )n pqΦ =  because it is necessary to solve the 
congruence 1mod ( )ed n≡ Φ  to find the decryption key .   
 
The Euler totient function is defined as 
 
1 21 1 1
1 1 2 2( ) ,rb b br rn p p p p p p− − −Φ = ⋅ ⋯                               (12) 
where 
2
2
1, if  is of type [3] mod 
1,        if  is of type [2,1] mod ,
1,         if  is of type [1] mod 
i i i
i i i
i i
p p f(x) t p
p p f(x) t p
p f(x) t p
 + +

= −

−

             (13) 
In practice, since ( )nΦ  depends on the type of an auxiliary polynomial, we 
choose e  prime to 21, 1, 1, 1, 1p q p q p p− − + + + +  and 2 1q q+ +  to cover 
all possible cases. 
 
The LUC3 cryptosystem is set up based on the third order Lucas sequence 
n
V  derived from the cubic polynomial 3 21 2 1 0,x M x M x− + − =  where 1M  
  and 2M  constitutes the plaintexts. Then, the encryption function is 
defined by 
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( )1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2( , ) ( , ,1), ( , ,1) ( , )mod ,e eE M M V M M V M M C C n= ≡              (14) 
 
where n pq=  as above, 1 2( , ,1)eV M M  and 2 1( , ,1)eV M M  are the -th term 
of the third order Lucas sequence defined by  
 
   1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( , ,1) ( , ,1) ( , ,1) ( , ,1)modk k k kV x x xV x x x V x x V x x n≡ − + ,        (15) 
 
with initial values 0 3,V =  1 1V x=  and 
2
2 1 22 .V x x= −   
 
The decryption key is ( , )d n where  is the inverse of  e  modulo ( ).nΦ  To 
decrypt the plaintext, the receiver must know or be able to compute ( )nΦ
and then calculate 
 
   ( )1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2( , ) ( , ,1), ( , ,1) ( , )mod ,d dD C C V C C V C C M M n= ≡          (16) 
 
which recovers the original plaintext 1 2( , ).M M   
 
2.4 LUC4,6 Cryptosystem 
A fourth order linear recurrence of Lucas function is a sequence of integers 
kV  defined by 
                              
4
1
1
( 1) ,ik i k i
i
V aV+
−
=
= −∑                                        (17) 
 
with initial values 20 1 1 2 1 24, , 2V V a V a a= = = −  and 
3
3 1 1 2 33 , 3 ,V a a a a= − + and ia  are coefficients in quartic polynomial, 
 
                                 
4 3 2
1 2 3 4 0,x a x a x a x a− + − + =                                  (18) 
 
Therefore, the encryption function for the LUC4.6 cryptosystem  is defined 
as 
 
1 2 3
1 2 3
2 2
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 2
3 2 1
1 2 3
( , , )
( ( , , ,1),
( , 1, 2 , 1, ,1),
( , , ,1)) mod
( , , ) mod ,
e
e
e
E M M M
V M M M
V M M M M M M M M M
V M M M n
C C C n
≡
− + − −
≡
    (19) 
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where pqn = , 1 2 3( , , )M M M  constitute the plaintexts and the encryption 
key, e relative prime to p – 1, q – 1, p + 1, q + 1, p2 + p + 1, q2 + q + 1, p3 + 
p2 + p + 1, and q3 + q2 + q + 1. Besides that, 1 2 3( , , ,1)eV M M M  and 
3 2 1( , , ,1)eV M M M  are the e-th term of the fourth order Lucas sequence and 
2 2
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 2( , 1, 2 , 1, ,1)eV M M M M M M M M M− + − −  is e-th term of the 
sixth order Lucas sequence. 
 
To decipher the plaintexts, the receiver must know or be able to compute 
the Euler totient function Φ(n) for the purpose to compute the decryption 
key is (d, n) where d is the inverse of e mod Φ(n).  The Euler totient 
function Φ(n) for this case can be defined as  
 
                        ( )n p qΦ = ⋅ ,                                           (20) 
where 
 
3 2
3
2
1,  if ( ) mod  is an irreducible quartic 
                            polynomial 
1, if ( ) mod  is an irreducible cubic 
                             polynomial times a linear factor
1
p p p f x p
p f x p
p p
+ + +
−
= − , if ( ) mod  is an irreducible quadratic 
                            polynomial times two linear factors
1, if ( ) mod  is two irreducible  
                             quadratic polynomials 
1, i
f x p
p f x p
p
+
− f ( ) mod  is four linear factorsf x p















,             (21) 
 
with 4 3 21 2 3( ) 1f x x C x C x C x= − + − + .  Similarly for q . 
 
Thus, the decryption function define as  
 
          
1 2 3
1 2 3
2 2
2 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 2
3 2 1
1 2 3
( , , )
( ( , , ,1),
( , 1, 2 , 1, ,1),
( , , ,1)) mod
( , , ) mod ,
d
d
d
D C C C
V C C C
V C C C C C C C C C
V C C C n
M M M n
≡
− + − −
≡
,                 (22) 
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which recovers the original plaintexts ),,( 321 mmm .  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
The Hastad’s attack is used Hastad’s Theorem to show that using 
RSA with low public exponent is insecure if the users are sending linearly 
related plaintexts over a large network (Hastad (1986)).   
 
Theorem 1 (Hastad’s Theorem) 
 Let 
1
k
ii
N n
=
= ∏  and 1min .i k in n≤ ≤= Given a set of k equations 
,0
0modji j ij a x n
δ
=
≡∑  where the moduli ni  are pairwise relatively prime 
and ( ), 0gcd , 1i j ija nδ = =  for all i.  Then it is possible to find x n<  in 
polynomial time if  ( 1)( 2) / 4 1 ( 1) / 22 ( 1)N nδ δ δ δ δδ+ + + +> + . 
 
Proof . See Joye (1997), Corollary 3.2.■ 
 
In 1996, Coppersmith extended the result from Hastad’s theorem that 
eventually becomes the Coppersmith’s theorem (Coppersmith (1996)).  
This theorem is specific for a monic integer polynomial of degree δ. 
 
Theorem 2 (Coppersmith’s Theorem) 
Let a monic integer polynomial P(x) of degree δ and a positive integer N of 
unknown factorization.  In time polynomial in log N and δ, we can find all 
integer solutions x0 to 0( ) 0modP x N≡  with 1/0x N δ< . 
 
Proof:  See Coppersmith (1996), Corollary 2.■ 
 
Joye (1997) had improved the Hastad’s theorem as follows. 
 
Theorem 3. Consider a system of k modular polynomial equations of 
degree ≤ δ with l variables given by   
     
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
, , , , 1 2
, , , 0
0mod
l
l
l
l
j j j
jj j
i j j j l i
j j j
a x x x n
δ+ + + ≤
=
≡∑
⋯
…
…
… ,                   (22) 
 
for i = 1, … , k and where x1, … , xi<n and iki nn ≤≤= 1min .  Let 
1
k
ii
N n
=
= ∏ , 1 1m m lf m m
δ
=
+ − 
=  
 
∑  and 0
1
m
l m
g
m
δ
=
+ − 
=  
 
∑ , if the 
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moduli ni are coprime, then ( )1 21 2
1 2
, , , ,
, , ,
gcd , 1l
l l
j j j
i j j j ij j j
a n
δ+ + + ≤
=
⋯
…
…
 for i = 1,…, k 
and if  
 
( 1) / 42g g g fN g n+> ,                                            (23) 
 
the result is in polynomial time a real-valued equation which is equivalent 
to Equation (23). 
 
Proof. See Joye (1997), Theorem 3.1.■ 
 
4.  HASTAD'S ATTACK 
4.1 Attack on the RSA Cryptosystem 
Suppose that m is the plaintext of RSA cryptosystem.  Let 
1
k
i
i
N n
=
=∑ , where 
( , ) 1,i jn n =
 
for ,i j≠
 
then the corresponding ciphertexts are 
mod .ei ic M n≡
 
 
We can find modeC M N≡  by Chinese remainder theorem. 
 
                                
1
mod
k
i i
i
C c u N
=
≡∑ ,                                        (24) 
 
where mod .j ij iu nδ≡
 
However, since ,C N<  it can be recovered. 
 
Corollary 1. In the RSA cryptosystem, a set of k linearly related plaintexts 
can be recovered if ( 1) 2k e e> +  and ( 1)( 2) 4 12 ( 1) .e e ein e+ + +> +   
 
Proof.  See (Joye 1997), Corollary 3.3.   ■ 
 
4.2 Attack on the LUC Cryptosystem 
In 1995, Pinch extend the Hastad’s attack to the LUC cryptosystem (Pinch 
(1995)).  Suppose that 1ki iN n== ∏  and 1min .i k in n≤ ≤=  Let M is the 
plaintext of LUC cryptosystem, then modi i i im M nα β≡ + and the 
ciphertext, ( ,1) mod .
ii e i i i
c V M nα β≡ +  The Dickson polynomial (Lidl 
(1993)) and Lucas sequence are equality already proved by Lidl.  
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Therefore,  
 
       ( ,1) ( ,1) mod
i ie i i e i i i
V M D M nα β α β+ ≡ + ,                        (25) 
 
where ( ,1)
ie i i
D Mα β+  is Dickson polynomial, which define as  
 
              
2
2
0
( ,1) ( 1) ( ) ,
ei
i
i
i e iii
e i i i i
i i
e ie
D M M
ie i
α β α β
 
 
−
=
−  
+ = − +  
−   
∑         (26) 
 
Thus, ( ,1) mod
ii e i i i
c V M nα β≡ +  can be considered as polynomials in M 
of degree ei.   
 
Corollary 2. In the LUC cryptosystem, a set of k linearly related plaintexts 
can be recovered if ( 1) 2k e e> +  and ( 1)( 2) 4 12 ( 1) ,e e ein e+ + +> + where 
1max .i k ie e≤ ≤=   
 
Proof.  See Pinch (1995), Theorem 3.   ■ 
 
4.3 Attack on the LUC3 Cryptosystem 
Suppose that 1
k
i iN n== ∏  and 1min .i k in n≤ ≤=  Let M1 and M2 are a set of the 
plaintexts of LUC3 cryptosystem, then 1, 1 modi i i iM M nα β≡ +  and 
2, 2 mod .i i i iM M nα β≡ +   
The ciphertexts are 1, 1 2( , ,1)modii e i i i i iC V M M nα β α β≡ + + and 
2, 1( , ,1)mod .ii e i i i i iC V M M nα β α β≡ + +  As we known, the third order of 
Dickson polynomial (Lidl (1993)) and Lucas sequence are equality.  
Therefore,  
  
 
1 2
1 2
( , ,1)
( , ,1)mod ,
i
i
e i i i i
e i i i i i
V M M
D M M n
α β α β
α β α β
+ +
≡ + +
                                 (27) 
 
where 1 2( , ,1)ie i i i iD M Mα β α β+ +  is Dickson polynomial, which define as
  
2 3
2 3
0 0
2( 1)( , ,1) ,
2
e ei i
i
i
i
i e i j ii
e
i j i
e i j i je
D x y x y
i j ie i j
   
   
− −
= =
− − +   −
=    +− −    
∑∑        (28) 
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where 2 3 .ii j e+ ≤   Similar for 2 1( , ,1)ie i i i iV M Mα β α β+ + . 
 
Thus, 1, 1 2( , ,1)modii e i i i i iC V M M nα β α β≡ + +  and 2, 2( ,ii e i iC V Mα β≡ +   
1 ,1)modi i iM nα β+  can be considered as polynomials in M1 and M2 of 
degree ei.   
 
Corollary 3. Let 1
k
i iN n== ∏  and 1min .i k in n≤ ≤= Given a set of k 
equations 
                 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
, , 1 2
, 0
0mod
j j
j j
i j j i
j j
a x x n
δ+ ≤
=
≡∑ ,                                      (29) 
 
where the moduli in are pairwise relatively prime and 
( )1 21 2 1 2, , , 0gcd , 1j ji j j ij ja nδ+ ≤= =  for all i.  Then it is possible to find x n<  in 
polynomial time if  
 
 ( )
2
1 1
2 3
( 1)( 2)( 3 4)
( 1)( 2) ( 1)( 2)116
22 ( 1)( 2)N n
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δδ δ
+ + + +
+ + + +
> + + .         (30) 
 
Proof.  In two variable case for Theorem 1. 
 
                     
1
3
1
1 ( 1)( 2)
m
mf m
m
δ
δ δ δ
=
+ 
= = + + 
 
∑ ,                        (31) 
 
                
1
2
0
1 ( 1)( 2)
m
m
g
m
δ
δ δ
=
+ 
= = + + 
 
∑ .                                  (32) 
 
Then, substitute Equations (32) and (33) into (24) will get Equation (31). 
 
Corollary 4.  In the LUC3 cryptosystem, a set of k linearly related 
plaintexts can be recovered if 1 ( 1)( 2)
3
k e e e> + + and 
2( 1)( 2)( 3 4) 1 ( 1)( 2)
16 212 ( ( 1)( 2)) ,
2
e e e e
e e
in e e
+ + + +
+ +
> + +  where 1max .i k ie e≤ ≤=   
 
Proof. The proving for this corollary is to verify that the conditions of 
Corollary 4.3 is fulfilled.  From the k sets of ciphertexts, there exist k 
equations  
 
On the Hastad's Attack to LUC4,6 Cryptosystem and Compared with Other RSA-Type Cryptosystem 
 
Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences                                          11 
 
 1, 1 2 1 2 1,( , ) ( , ,1) 0modii e i i i i i iP M M D M M C nα β α β≡ + + − ≡ ,       (33) 
 
 2, 1 2 2 1 2,( , ) ( , ,1) 0modii e i i i i i iP M M D M M C nα β α β≡ + + − ≡ .      (34) 
 
Suppose that the moduli in are pairwise coprime and also that the 
coefficients of polynomials 1, 1 2( , )iP M M  and 2, 1 2( , )iP M M  are relatively 
prime to ,in  otherwise the plaintexts can be recovered by factoring .in   
 
Since 
1 ( 1)( 2)
3
k e e e> + +  and 
2( 1)( 2)( 3 4) 1 ( 1)( 2)
16 212 ( ( 1)( 2)) ,
2
e e e e
e e
in e e
+ + + +
+ +
> + +  
it follows 
 
 
( )
1
3
2
1 1
2 3
( 1)( 2) 1
1
1 2
( 1)( 2)( 3 4)
( 1)( 2) ( 1)( 2)116
22 ( 1)( 2) ,
e e ek
i i
i i
e e e e
e e e e e
N n n n
e e n
+ + +
= =
+ + + +
+ + + +
= ≥
> + +
∏ ∏
             (35) 
 
where 1 1min .i kn n≤ ≤=    ■ 
 
4.4  Attack on the LUC4,6 Cryptosystem 
Suppose that 
1
k
ii
N n
=
= ∏  and 1min i k in n≤ ≤= .  Let m1, m2 and m3 are a set 
of the plaintexts of LUC4,6 cryptosystem, then 1, 1 modi i i im m nα β≡ + , 
2, 2 modi i i im m nα β≡ + , and 3, 3 mod .i i i im m nα β≡ + Therefore, the 
ciphertexts are 
 
 1, 1 2 3( , , ,1) modii e i i i i i i ic V m m m nα β α β α β≡ + + +   ,        (36) 
       
2, 2 1 3
2 2
1 3 2
1 3 2
( , ( )( ) 1,
( ) ( ) 2( ),
( )( ) 1, ,1)mod ,
ii e i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
c V m m m
m m m
m m m n
α β α β α β
α β α β α β
α β α β α β
≡ + + + −
+ + + − +
+ + − +
                    (37) 
 
 3, 3 2 1( , , ,1)modi e i i i i i i iic V m m m nα β α β α β≡ + + +   ,                       (38) 
 
Since the Hastad’d attack is relied on the polynomial structure, then the 
Lucas sequence should be transform to polynomial.  In this situation, the 
Dickson polynomial (Dickson (1987)) is able to transform it.  That mean, 
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the fourth order and sixth order of Dickson polynomials and Lucas 
sequences both are equivalent. 
 
Proposition 1.  The fourth order Lucas sequence are equivalent to the three 
variables of Dickson polynomials, which is defined as  
  
       ( )( )
( )
2 3 4
0 0 0
2 3 4
( , , ,1) ( , , ,1)
( 1) 2 3
2 3
,
e ei i
e e ei i i i k
i i
i j k
i
e i j k i ji
V x y z D x y z
e e i j k i j k
i ji j ke i j k
i j
x y zi
     
+     
     
= = =
− − −
∑ ∑ ∑
=
 −
− − − + +
=   ++ +
− − − 
+×
   (39) 
 
where 2 3 4 ii j k e+ + ≤ . 
 
Proof.  See Wong (2011),  Proposition 3.5.  ■ 
 
Proposition 2. The sixth order Lucas sequence is equivalent to the five 
variables of Dickson polynomials, which is define as 
  
          
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 3 52 3 4 5 6
0 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 1
1 2 3 4 5
( , , , , ,1)
( , , , , ,1)
( 1)
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
ei
ei
e e e e ei i i i i i i i
i
i i i i i
i
i
V x x x x x
D x x x x x
e
e i i i i i
e i i i i i i
i i i i i
         
+ +         
         
= = = = =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
=
 
−
=  
− − − − − 
− − − − − + 
×  
+ + + + 
2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 4 5 61 2 3 4 5
1
1 2 3 11 2
31 2 4
2 3 4 5 ,
e i i i i ii
ii i i
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
x
i i i ii i
x x x x
− − − − −
+ + + 
 
+ + + 
+ + + + + +   
×    
+ + +    
×
                   (40) 
 
where 1 2 3 4 52 3 4 5 6 ii i i i i e+ + + + ≤ . 
  
Proof.  See Wong (2011), Proposition 3.6.  ■ 
 
By Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, Equations (37), (38), and (39) can be 
considered as polynomials in m1, m2 and m3 of degree ei.   
 
For Hastad’s Theorem, there is a variable to be considered.  However, the 
LUC4,6 cryptosystem had three variables.  Therefore, there are necessary to 
modify the Hastad’s Theorem.   
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Corollary 5:  Let 1ki iN n=∏=  and 1min .i k in n≤ ≤=  Given a set of k equations 
 
                     
1 2 3
31 2
, , , 1 2 31 2 3
, , 01 2 3
0mod ,
j j j jj j
i j j j ij j j
a x x x n
δ+ + ≤
=
∑ ≡                             (41) 
 
where the moduli ni are pairwise relatively prime and ( )1 2 3, , ,1 2 3 , ,1 2 3gcd , 1j j ji j j j ij j ja nδ+ + ≤ =  for all i.  Then it is possible to find x n<  in 
polynomial time if  
  
( )
2( 1)( 2 )( 3)( 4 )( 2 3) 1( 1)( 2)( 3)6144 1
6
1 ( 1)( 2)( 3)8
2 ( 1)( 2)( 3)
,
N
n
δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
+ + + + + +
+ + +
+ + +
> + + +
×
         (42) 
 
Proof. In three variables case for Theorem 3, 
 
         
1
2 1 ( 1)( 2)( 3),
8m
mf m
m
δ δ δ δ δ
=
∑
+ 
= = + + + 
 
                        (43) 
and 
                
0
2 1 ( 1)( 2)( 3),
6m
m
g m
m
δ δ δ δ δ
=
∑
+ 
= = + + + 
 
                 (44) 
 
Then, substitute Equations (45) and (46) into Equation (24), get Equation 
(43).  ■ 
 
Corollary 6. In the LUC4,6 cryptosystem, a set of k linearly related 
plaintexts can be recovered if  
 
                        
)3)(2)(1(81 +++> eeeek   ,                                      (45) 
and 
 
( ) )3)(2)(1(61144
)32)(4)(3)(2)(1(
6
1
2
)3)(2)(1(2 +++
++++++
+++>
eee
eeeeee
i eeen  ,   (46) 
 
where iki ee ≤≤= 1max . 
 
Proof. The proving for this corollary is to verify that the conditions of 
Corollary 1 are fulfilled.  From the k sets of ciphertexts, there exist k 
equations  
 
1, 1 2 3 1 2 3 1,( , , ) ( , , ,1) 0mod .i e i i i i i i i iiP m m m D m m m c nα β α β α β≡ + + + − ≡       (47) 
Wong Tze Jin, Hailiza Kamarulhaili & Mohd. Rushdan Md Said 
 
14 Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences 
 
,mod0
mod)1,,1))((
),(2)()(
,1))((,(),,(
,2231
2
2
3
2
1
312321,1
i
iiiiiiii
iiiiii
iiiiiiei
n
ncmmm
mmm
mmmVmmmP
i
≡
−+−++
+−+++
−+++≡
βαβαβα
βαβαβα
βαβαβα
       (48) 
iiiiiiiiei ncmmmDmmmP i mod0)1,,,(),,( ,3123321,3 ≡−+++≡ βαβαβα   ,     (49) 
 
Suppose that the moduli in  are pairwise coprime and also that the 
coefficients of polynomials 1, 1 2 3( , , ),iP m m m 2, 1 2 3( , , )iP m m m and 
3, 1 2 3( , , )iP m m m  are relatively prime to ni; otherwise the plaintexts can be 
recovered by factoring  ni.. 
Since  
                   
1
8 ( 1)( 2)( 3),k e e e e> + + +   ,                               (50) 
 
 ( )
2( 1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 2 3) 1( 1)( 2)( 3)6144 1
62 ( 1)( 2)( 3) ,
e e e e e e
e e e
in e e e
+ + + + + +
+ + +
> + + +            (51) 
 
it follows 
 
 ( )
1 ( 1)( 2 )( 3) 18
1 2
2( 1)( 2)( 3)( 4 )( 2 3) 1( 1)( 2)( 3)6144 1
6
1 ( 1)( 2 )( 3)8
2 ( 1)( 2)( 3)
,
e e e ek
i i
i
e e e e e e
e e e
e e e e
N n n
e e e
n
+ + + +
=
+ + + + + +
+ + +
+ + +
∏ ∏= ≥
> + + +
×
               (52) 
 
where 1min i k in n≤ ≤= .  ■ 
 
Coppersmith based variation method is based on the Coppersmith’s 
theorem which is defined in Theorem 2.  With this method, sending more 
than e linearly related plaintexts that are encrypted via RSA or LUC 
cryptosystem with encryption key, e and RSA-moduli ni is dangerous. 
However, this method cannot be directly applied to LUC4,6 cryptosystems. 
This is because one of the conditions in Coppersmith’s theorem is that the 
polynomial, which is analyzed should be a monic polynomial, but the 
polynomials in LUC4,6 cryptosystems are multivariable polynomials.   
 
Nevertheless, Julta improved the theorem to multivariable 
polynomials (Julta (1998)).  In that article, the author states the following: 
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“Let 1( , , ) 0modmP x x N≡…  be a modular 
multivariable polynomial equation, in m variables, and total 
degree k with a root ix ,0 , for 1 .i m≤ ≤  Let 0, iix N
α< , 
1
i kα <∑   and k linear independent integer polynomial 
equations (in m variables) of total degree polynomial in 
Nmk log , in polynomial time in logmk N , such that each 
of the equations has ix ,0  as a root.”   
 
Therefore, all integer solution 0,ix  to 1( , , ) 0 modmP x x N≡…  can be 
found with 10, kix N< . 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
For LUC4,6 cryptosystem, Dickson polynomial is enabling the 
Lucas sequence to transform into  multivariate polynomial.  When the 
plaintexts transform from the sequence to the polynomial, then the number 
of plaintexts are required to succeed the Hastad’s attack can be found.  By 
Coppersmith based variation and the statement from Julta, we can conclude 
that the result of sending more than e linearly related plaintexts that are 
encrypted via LUC4,6 cryptosystem with encryption key, e and RSA-moduli 
ni is dangerous.  
 
Based on Corollary 1, 2, 4, and 6, the number of plaintexts are 
required to succeed the Hastad’d attack for the RSA, LUC, LUC3, and  
LUC4,6 cryptosystems can be found.  Hence, the comparison of the 
requirement of the number of plaintexts between RSA, LUC, LUC3 and 
LUC4,6 had been shown in Table 1. 
 
 TABLE 1: The number of plaintexts, k  required to succeed the Hastad’s Attack 
 
e 3 5 7 11 13 17 19 
RSA 7 16 29 67 92 154 191 
LUC 7 16 29 67 92 154 191 
LUC3 21 71 169 573 911 1939 2661 
LUC4,6 46 211 631 3004 5461 14536 21946 
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Table 1 show that the requirement of the number of plaintexts to 
succeed the Hastad’s attack for the LUC4,6 cryptosystem is the highest.  For 
LUC4,6 cryptosystem, if public key, 19=e , at least 21946 plaintexts is 
required to hack the LUC4,6 cryptosystem using Hastad’s attack.  If the 
cryptosystem is 128-bit, how many number of plaintext is required? It is 
almost 504 bits of number. Thus, the LUC4,6 cryptosystem is more secure 
than RSA, LUC and LUC3 cryptosystems.  
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